China's Military Options Over North Korea's Exploding a Nuclear Device

Background

Asia Week recently reported that that the PLA’s intelligence network inside North Korea has was compromised and North Korean frontier troops recently shot a Chinese frontier guard.[i] This occurred on top of North Korea’s exploding of a nuclear device which has led to China cancelling all leave for its soldiers on its frontier with North Korea and massing its forces along the border.[ii] Is this a response to a fear of a flood of refugees into China, a measure to show China’s displeasure at the exploding of a nuclear device, or forces gathering as a precursor for a ‘lesson’ as occurred in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. China wants stability in the region yet since the explosion, China has threatened to fire a nuclear armed ballistic missile on any nation threatening it, presume ably US forces in the region. This has seen Japan and the United States announce the acceleration of their joint ballistic missile defense measures which China views as a direct to its strategic deterrence. The possible implosion and flood of refugees that could stream into China if the North Korean government collapsed in the event of a Chinese attack is outweighed by the loss of China’s strategic ballistic missile deterrence.

Chapter two of China’s National Defense 2004 White Paper stated that “China adheres to its military strategy of active defense,” with Chapter one attacking the United States for accelerating its development of BMD, Japan’s development of BMD..’ The Chinese government repeatedly claim it would not use nuclear weapons first. Yet by definition a “offensive defensive” doctrine is a lynchpin of China’s active defense strategy. The Chinese intervention against United Nations Forces in the Korean War, and the Sino-Vietnamese conflict, are justified by the PLA using this strategy. It has been argued that the 1962 Sino-Indian occurred because of the Chinese professional preference for the offensive defensive doctrine in which the initial spoiling attack is staged against the weaker adversary (India) on the eve of an assumed coordinated attack against China a stronger one (the USSR)

Pre-emptive operations or spoiling attacks have been part of the PLA’s doctrine since its beginning as the Red Army. Thus, to stop a nuclear armed Japan or one with long range anti-ballistic missiles and sensors, China could attack and topple the North Korean government, to remove the threat behind a nuclear armed Japan. China certainly feels threatened by any ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems in North East Asia that threaten its ballistic missile land-based deterrence system. The acquisition of BMDs by Taiwan and Japan have made sections of the in the Chinese government feel that these are part of a United States containment strategy. If China felt threatened it might launch an attack on North Korea, including the use of ballistic missiles “on warning of threat,” believing that if it waited to “launch on warning” (of a launch) or wait until “launch under attack” its missiles would be intercepted before they could be used. China believes the latter scenarios destroy the basis of its strategic deterrence, and also the warheads would fall on China.
Strategic Quandary

The Chinese leadership was in a strategic quandary before North Korea exploded a nuclear device, due to the deployment of advanced BMD systems in Northeast Asia, in response to the build up of Chinese and North Korean ballistic missiles. The accelerated acquisition of BMD systems by Japan and South Korea, and the forward deployment by BMD US forces will make the Chinese government feel uneasy. If the Chinese leadership follows its doctrine of active defense and believed its nuclear deterrence was becoming neutralized or under threat, it could launch strikes against North Korea.

Besides the use of ballistic missiles, there are other military options available to China.
These could include the capture or neutralisation of key nuclear and WMD installations by Chinese special forces elements supported by airborne and airmobile forces, prior to an attack by China’s new armoured corps using deep strike operations.

Deep Strike

The PLA in March 2005 conducted a Battle Management C4I exercise in the Talikmakan Desert to develop and test new doctrine for the new corps and brigade structures.[iii] Involving over 10,000 personnel and 1,000 vehicles, the exercise saw an Army Battle Group formed, with a headquarters having four subordinate groups. The article concentrated on the Joint Tactical Group, which was responsible for operations. Joint operations involving aircraft and artillery strikes in conjunction with offensive electronic warfare were practiced. The armoured forces involved operated with armed helicopters. All these aircraft movements and artillery missions including both tubed artillery and multiple rocket launchers, would have also tested the PLA and PLAAF’s joint doctrine in airspace control.

To adapt to informatised warfare and to enable more rapid decision making on the battlefield, the PLA has decided to increase the number of army corps by removing the division and instead adopting a three-level command system of corps, brigade and battalion.[iv] Like the ex-Soviet countries, the People’s Liberation Army is based on the old Soviet triangular model that uses a corps, division and regimental command and control structure. The regiment acted as the basic tactical unit, subordinate to the division as it lacked sufficient staff officers and command powers within its headquarters to act independently of the division. Going from a Russian style corps and divisional structure requires few changes at the battalion or even regimental level, but does mean is a radical change in command and control arrangements as the brigade is expected to act independently once committed into operations, with the company the basic combat unit.

The Armor Heavy Corps

The PLA is going away from its triangular structure at the higher levels to a square organisation of two armored and two mechanized brigades in its heavy combined army group (corps). Currently a Group Army (heavy) is composed of one armoured and three mechanised divisions, an air defence brigade, an artillery brigade, a helicopter group (dadui), an engineering regiment, headquarters unit and a logistical support unit. The divisions are in the classic triangular structure with three companies to a battalion, three battalions to a regiment and three regiments to a division. Even the armoured and mechanised companies have a structure of three platoons and one headquarters vehicle. This force totals around 70, 000 and personnel with around 600 main battle tanks (MBTs), over 300 pieces of artillery of 122mm calibre and above and more than 1,000 various armoured vehicles in support.[v] Some of these units still exist.

Contrast this with the new structure, which besides two mechanised and two armoured brigades, has a brigade each of aviation, artillery, air defence and engineers each composed of four battalions, and a battalion for chemical defense, communications, corps level air defense and electronic warfare. The new PLA armored corps is envisioned to have a total of 500 main battle tanks; 586 tracked infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), 126 155mm self-propelled guns; 96 120mm turreted self-propelled mortars; 36 30 tube 122mm and 27 300mm 12 tube multiple rocket launchers; 12 DF-15D tactical missiles and 48 attack, 18 multipurpose and 60 transport helicopters and around 2,000 other types of vehicles.[vi] Its peacetime establishment is 22,180, which rises to around 23,000 in wartime.[vii] New ZTZ 99 main battle tanks and ZDB 97 infantry fighting vehicles will be the core of the corps C4I with battlefield management systems down the individual vehicle.

The biggest change in the corps structure is within the company structure. Under the current structure there are three AFVs (tanks or armored personnel carriers) per platoon, then three platoons per company and a headquarters vehicle to make ten AFVs per company. In the new structure there are now four AFVs per platoon and two AFVs at the company headquarters to give a total of 14 AFVs.[viii] Not only is the company now larger by four vehicles it can still operate as a viable maneuver element with casualties whereas three vehicle platoons have trouble providing fire and movement with two vehicles. At the battalion level the only supporting weapons are the battalion’s six 120mm self-propelled mortars. T o open the way and for time critical targets the PLA will employ special forces and other light infantry forces.



Chinese Special Forces

Since the mid-1990s the roles of the PLA Special Forces have grown, and were the first to units to be issued unmanned air vehicles, battlefield video systems and thermal imaging systems.[ix] The PLA Special Forces now train to attack the ‘accupoints of the enemy’, such as ballistic missile sites by direct action, or as in a recent exercise, inserted by helicopter and parachute to provide targeting data for strategic bombers and theatre ballistic missiles of the Second Artillery force.[x]

During the exercise Special Forces elements were inserted by helicopter and parachute and provided targeting data for strategic bombers and tactical ballistic missiles of the Second Artillery force. This means that the DF-15 theatre ballistic missiles in the corps will still be under the control of the Second Artillery and not the corps commander. It can send its payload 600 km and this poses a problem for the both the corps and theater commanders. The command and control of China’s ballistic missile force has come under some debate inside the PLA. In the late 1990s control of the PLA’s short-range ballistic missiles was delegated to the group armies.[xi] With the creation of the corps as the major combat group, this has created a command and control problem for the use of TBMs. The 600km range DF-15 would now come under a corps commander instead of the control of the military region commander. This is seen as unlikely as theatre ballistic missiles would come back under control of the Second Artillery Force as a recent exercise in the Talikmakan Desert showed.


Airmobile and Airborne Operations


The PLA operates a ‘light mechanized infantry experimental group’, in Sichuan, which is part of the Chengdu Military Region. An airmobile trials unit in Western terminology, the group is developing and testing new joint concepts and equipment required for the new corps aviation brigade. Eighty percent of the unit's equipment is new or modernized and is not available to other PLA units. This unit has quadrupled the firepower of the unit it was formed from, with only 30 percent of the original personnel. The article refers to it as a ‘newborn baby’ of integrated training and is an ‘integrated entity of operational elements such as intelligence and reconnaissance, navigation and positioning, three-dimensional mobility, fire strikes, command and control and battlefield management. In other words it is organised as an independent task force. The unit is entirely airmobile—all vehicles are able to be slung underneath or stored inside the unit’s helicopters. Unless the PLA Air Force’s (PLAAF) heavy-lift helicopters were transferred to the PLA’s army aviation force, this implies that the unit is a joint PLA/PLAAF unit). New equipment includeds an eight-wheeled high mobility amphibious vehicle with an automated fire control system equipped with cannons and missiles. There are also fast attack vehicles similar to the models used by the US Army and US Navy SEALS. The unit relies on manoeuvrability, surprise and advanced fire control systems to bring its firepower to bear. Many of the vehicles have a 35mm lightweight automatic grenade launcher (AGL) and a 12.7mm heavy machine gun. There is even a modular lightweight towed 107mm multiple rocket launcher.

To deploy and support these units, PLA army aviation units have Z-9G helicopters equipped with IIR sensors, cannon and rocket pods, and air-to-air and anti-tank guided missiles.[xii] The PLA used their first airmobile regiment with its Z-9G helicopters in Xinjiang to develop high altitude tactics and operating procedures. For movement of personnel PLAAF Mi-17 transport helicopters are available. These are equipped with a navigation radar and uprated engines with an auxiliary power unit to ensure reliable starting at altitudes up to 4,000m’.[xiii]

Chinese airborne personnel are being equipped with the latest Chinese infantry weapons like the Model 92 pistol, Model 95 assault rifle and squad automatic weapon, the QLZ87 35mm AGL and the Model 89 120mm anti-tank rocket launcher.[xiv] They also have a number of ZSL2000 airborne combat vehicles than can be air dropped This vehicle mounts a two-man turret with a 25mm automatic cannon, a co-axial 7.62mm machine gun and a turret mount for Hong Jia ATGM

Light Infantry Operations in the Korean Mountains

The PLA has considerable operational experience in high altitude and mountain warfare including operations in Tibet from 1951-1974, the 1962 Sino-Indian War and the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. Mountain warfare, by its nature suited to light infantry, and the PLA’s new emphasis on informatization and rapidly mobile units, ideally fit into light infantry operations.

High altitude operations by the PLA are moving towards the Russian concept of Reconnaissance – Combat Operations (RBD) for counter-insurgency operations. Based on tactics developed in Soviet times, the need to identify and attack Chechen insurgents in mountainous areas saw the concept refined.[xv] RBD is being introduced into the PLA and involves the extensive use of signals intelligence, helicopters and reconnaissance teams to provide intelligence for light infantry blocking forces, and providing fire coordination for long range artillery and air support. The PLA is already developing these forces as part of its drive towards informatization especially for its high altitude forces on China’s western periphery. .

The Western periphery of China contains the World’s largest mountain ranges and high desert plateaus. The forces in Tibet and Xinjiang require lighter forces as the infrastructure as this type of terrain is generally unsuited to large heavy armored forces and there are long borders to patrol. The PLA has equipped its mountain brigades in Tibet and the 6th Independent Division in Xinjiang, the first mechanized infantry division to be deployed at this height, with wheeled armored fighting vehicles.[xvi] These units could quickly redeploy to Shenyang.

PLA light infantry are now being trained and equipped to operate in their traditional roles of screening, flank protection and jungle and high altitude operations over larger over than before, with elite units now becoming the PLA’s choice for conversion into airmobile units. New rations enable the PLA to conduct extended operations without having to rely on the civilian population for rationing and light infantry are now able to conduct covert operations without compromising themselves by needing to replenish rations. Their lack of supporting weapons, when outside their helicopters and light armored vehicles, means that their need for access to supporting forces is still necessary as they can quickly become overwhelmed by conventional forces.

The enable sustained operations in the field during cold weather the PLA has introduced the 05 series of pre-packaged field rations. These are heated in a flameless heater pouch similar to the one in the US military’s MREs and can heat meals up to 600C. [xvii]

The PLA has not left the light infantry bereft of tanks with the ZTS-63A amphibious tank replacing the venerable Type 62 light tank which have equipped Chinese equipped armored regiments supporting light infantry and were prominent in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. Equipped with a modern fire control system and a 105mm gun, it can navigate North Korea’s paddy fields much better than its predecessor.


PLAAF Long Range Interdiction and Strike Missions

The PLAAF’s main strike weapon is the obsolete Xian X-6 bomber which is a copy of the old Tu-16 bomber from the 1950s. The PLAAF does however contain a sizeable amount of Su-27 and Su-30 fighters to protect its attack aircraft from intercepting North Korean fighters and shotting down surface –to-air missiles if necessary. The majority of PLA attack aircraft lack precision guided munitions and bad weather/ night attack avionics but would provide support to PLA ground forces out to their limited range. The majority of North Korea’s nuclear facilities would be within their range from the many PLAAF air bases available. The PLAAF does not however have anywhere near enough, if any, precision guided conventional munitions capable of hitting and destroying hardened underground facilities as North Korea has scattered across the entire country.

If All Else Fails – Russian Heavy Bombers

If the PLA were to become stuck in the North Korean countryside or mountains and it looked like it could escalate to a nuclear exchange there, the Russians could be expected to intervene as this has been practiced before. From 18 to 25 August 2005 elements of the Chinese and Russian armed forces conducted an eight-day joint exercise with the stated aim of the exercise to strengthen ‘the capability of the two armed forces to jointly fight international terrorism, extremism and separatism.’ Primarily a Chinese firepower demonstration exercise with Russian support, it was aimed at the governments in Pyongyang and Tokyo, to pressure North Korea to go back to the six party nuclear talks and Japan over its border claim to the Kurils.

The Russian Air Force employed four Tu-22M3 strategic bombers and two Tu-95MS on a conventional strike mission to soften up the defences before the amphibious landing. The Tu-95MS is a cruise missile carrier, unsuited to the conventional bombing role in comparison to the Tu-23M3, but the crews would have had the opportunity to carry out mock cruise missile attacks against possible targets in North East Asia The Russians provided the bulk of the high technology and larger items of military equipment. Russian aircraft, besides the Tu95MS and Tu22M3, included Il-76 military freighters, an Il-78 aerial refuelling tanker, an A-50 AEW&C, Su-24M2 strike aircraft and a Su-27SM fighters.

These military options are within the ability of the PLA today. The Fall exercises have finished so many of the PLA units are at the peak of their training. Only time will tell what occurs.

[i] . Callick, Rowan. ‘North's spy coup upsets Red Army’, The Australian online, 21 October 2006.
[ii] . Sheridan, Michael. ‘China on alert over a nuclear neighbour’, Sunday Times online, 8 October 2006.

[iii] . Wei Chun. ‘Battle on the Sea of Death Battlefield’, PLA Pictorial, 1 April 2005, pp. 28 – 31.

[iv] . “Military to be restructured: Paper”, Xinuanet, 13 July 2005.

[v] . Wang Hui, ZTZ-98 zhuzhantanke zhuanji, Inner Mongolia Cultural Publishing Company, 2002, p. 74.

[vi] . By comparison the US Army Division 86 Aviation Brigade fielded 134 aircraft including 48 attack helicopters. Wilson, John B. Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades, Center of Military History U.S. Army, Washington D.C., 1998, p. 386.

[vii] . Wang Hui, op. cit., p. 76.

[viii] . Wang Hui, op. cit., p. 77.

[ix] . ‘Chinese Army takes on New Look’, Peoples Daily Online, 19 June 2002.

[x] . ‘Airborne Unit Begins Winter Drill to Retrain Troop’, Beijing Kongjun Bao, 11 December 2004; Wei Chun. “Battle on the Sea of Death Battlefield”, PLA Pictorial, 1 April 2005, pp. 28 – 31.

[xi] . Wang Hui, op. cit., p. 74.

[xii] . ‘Da zaozong hezhao zhangxinglui hangbudui’, Xiandai junshizao (CONMILIT), 2004 Niandi, 2 Qi, Zhongdi 325 Qi,
pp. 10 & 11.

[xiii] . Lavrentiev, A.P. The International Workhorse - the Mi-17, located on the Kazan Helicopter Production Association website.

[xiv]. Yingjichangkong __ zhongguo konggjiangbing zhuangbei daquan (yi)’, Qing Bingqi, 2006 Niandi, 7 xia Qi, Zhongdi 227 Qi, pp. 12 – 15.

[xv] . Kiselev , Valeriy. ‘Acquired – Destroyed’, Armeyskiy Sbornik, Number 8-2001, pp. 35 – 39.

[xvi] . ‘PLA Dispatched 10 Additional Divisions to the Sino-Afghan Border’, World Journal, 7 October 2001.

[xvii] . ‘Zhandouli zhiyuan wojun junyong shipin zonghentan (xia)’, Bingq Zhishii, 2006 Niandi, 6 Qi, Zhongdi 224 Qi, pp. 53 – 55.